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I. INTRODUCTION
The law of evidence in Illinois has developed from the common
law, from statutory evidentiary rules, and from selective adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The purpose of this Article is to
update practitioners on changes and refinements in Illinois' unique
law of evidence that occurred during the Survey year.
II. WITNESSES
A. Expert Witnesses
In Trower v. Jones,' the Illinois Supreme Court overturned
eighty years of precedent2 by holding that a trial judge has the dis-
* Visiting Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago; B.S., honors, 1954; J.D.,
cum laude, 1957, Loyola University of Chicago; S.J.D., 1960, University of Wisconsin at
Madison.
** B.S.M., 1972, Northwestern University School of Medicine; M.B.A., 1984, Keller
Graduate School of Management; J.D. candidate, 1989, Loyola University of Chicago.
1. 121 I11. 2d 211, 520 N.E.2d 297 (1988).
2. See McMahon v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 239 Ill. 334, 88 N.E. 223 (1909) (impeach-
ment limited solely to the number of times the physician expert testified for the defend-
ant); Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Smith, 226 I11. 178, 80 N.E. 716 (1907) (no cross-
examination about whether the principal part of a physician expert's work was consulting
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cretion to permit cross-examination of an expert concerning both
the frequency with which he testifies for one category of party and
the annual income derived from serving as an expert.3 Tradition-
ally, Illinois courts have held that such evidence is only admissible
upon an affirmative showing of bias.4
In Trower, the plaintiffs hired a medical expert to review the
plaintiffs' medical malpractice claim and to testify about the treat-
ing physician's conduct.' The trial judge permitted the defense
counsel to cross-examine the expert on whether he usually testified
for "people suing doctors."6 The Illinois Appellate Court for the
Fourth District held that the defense counsel's cross-examination
of the expert constituted reversible error because there was no di-
rect connection between the expert's pecuniary interest and his
testimony.7
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's deci-
sion, holding that cross-examination on the frequency of an ex-
pert's testimony for one party and on the annual income from such
testimony is admissible.8 The court reasoned that its earlier deci-
sions9 held only that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
excluding such evidence.'" The supreme court also cited the fol-
lowing changes in expert witness testimony as supporting its con-
with attorneys); Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. v. Schmitz, 211 Ill. 446, 71 N.E. 1050 (1904) (no
cross-examination of physician expert about his opinion in other suits).
3. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 217-18, 520 N.E.2d at 302.
4. See E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 705.2 (4th
ed. 1984).
5. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 213, 520 N.E.2d at 298. The expert was hired through an
expert locator service. Id.
6. Id. at 214, 520 N.E.2d at 298.
7. Trower v. Jones, 149 I1. App. 3d 705, 721-22, 500 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (4th Dist.
1986). The appellate court stated that an expert witness could only be questioned on the
number, frequency, and income of referrals from the plaintiffs' attorney. Id. at 722-23,
500 N.E.2d at 1145. The appellate court relied on Schoolfield v. Witkowski, 54 Ill. App.
2d 111, 203 N.E.2d 460 (1st Dist. 1964), which held that an expert witness cannot be
cross-examined about testifying only for plaintiffs during the preceding year. Trower, 149
Ill. App. 3d at 721, 500 N.E.2d at 1144. The appellate court also stated that cross-
examination regarding compensation for expert testimony in unrelated cases is not rele-
vant to show that the expert was not a full-time practicing clinician. Id. at 723, 500
N.E.2d at 1146. The appellate court declined to extend the holding in Sears v. Rut-
ishauser, 102 Ill. 2d 402, 466 N.E.2d 210 (1984), which permitted cross-examination on
how often the plaintiff's expert received referrals from the plaintiff's attorney and how
much income he received from the referrals. Trower, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 722, 500 N.E.2d
at 1145.
8. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 215, 520 N.E.2d at 299.
9. See, e.g., Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Smith, 226 Ill. 178, 80 N.E. 716 (1907); Chicago
& E. Ill. R.R. v. Schmitz, 211 I11. 446, 71 N.E. 1050 (1904).
10. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 215, 520 N.E.2d at 299.
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clusion: Experts now give opinions without stating the factual
basis;" experts have increased latitude in giving their opinions; 12
expert locator services have increased the availability of experts; 13
and experienced expert witnesses are better able to handle cross-
examination. '4
Regarding the admissibility of testimony on the frequency with
which an expert witness appears for one party, the court reasoned
that testifying for only one side may indicate a "predisposition to
exculpate or find fault,"'I5 a factor "of some value" to jury delibera-
tion.' 6 The court also rejected the suggestion that secondary ex-
perts would be needed to rehabilitate the expert's testimony
because the expert can explain the reason for testifying for one
side. 17
In Witherell v. Weimer, " the Illinois Supreme Court redefined
its requirement 9 that only an expert licensed in the same "school
of medicine" as the defendant can establish the standard of medical
11. See Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836
(1981) (adopting Rules 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permit
expert witnesses to give opinions without prior disclosure of the facts or data underlying
the opinions); FED. R. EvID. 703, 705.
12. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 215, 520 N.E.2d at 299 (citing Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d
186, 417 N.E.2d 1322, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981) (allowing medical expert to
render an opinion without disclosing underlying facts including hospital records)).
13. Id. at 216, 520 N.E.2d at 299.
14. Id. The increased witness latitude and expertise make it more difficult for the
cross-examining attorney to probe for bias, partisanship, or financial interest. Id. at 217,
520 N.E.2d at 300. The court also recognized that some experts turn favorable verdicts
into higher fees and more invitations to become a witness. Id. at 218, 520 N.E.2d at 300.
The court rejected the argument that questioning about past fees and the frequency of
testimony would require prolonged rehabilitation because high income would not neces-
sarily mean that an opinion was biased. Id. at 219, 520 N.E.2d at 301. Counsel, how-
ever, should limit rehabilitation to brief testimony on how the witness determines fees
and how the witness's fees compare with those charged by other expert witnesses in the
same field. Id. See also Graham, Impeaching the Professional Expert Witness by Showing
of Financial Interest, 53 IND. L.J. 35, 40 (1977).
15. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 220, 520 N.E.2d at 301.
16. Id. For example, a physician may choose to testify only for medical malpractice
defendants and not for malpractice plaintiffs to avoid colleagues' displeasure. Id.
17. Id. at 221, 520 N.E. at 301-02. The extent of explanation is properly left to the
circuit court's discretion. Id.
18. 118 Ill. 2d 321, 515 N.E.2d 68 (1987).
19. See Dolan v. Galluzzo, 77 Ill. 2d 279, 396 N.E.2d 13 (1979) (licensed orthopedic
surgeon not permitted to testify on standard of care for defendant podiatrist, even though
the surgeon performed the same procedure). See also Purtill v. Hess, 111 111. 2d 229, 489
N.E.2d 867 (1986) (physician permitted to testify on standard of care for defendant phy-
sician); Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 83 Ill. 2d 282, 415 N.E.2d 390 (1980) (health
physicist, an expert in radiation treatment, permitted to testify on standard of care of the
hospital's x-ray treatment).
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care in a medical malpractice trial. 20 In Witherell, both the defend-
ant physician and the plaintiff's expert were from the same school
of medicine, but the expert was not licensed.2' The court stated
that the absence of a license did not prejudice the defendant.22 On
the other hand, the testimony of an expert educated in a different
school of medicine would unfairly prejudice the defendant.23
B. Cross-Examination
In People v. Gacho,24 the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated its
position that the scope of cross-examination rests within the discre-
tion of the trial judge whose ruling will be overturned only on a
showing of manifest prejudice to the defendant. 25 The defendant in
Gacho argued that the State's cross-examination of him concerning
evidence of other crimes was improper and inadmissible.26 The
supreme court, however, determined that the State may ask ques-
tions on cross-examination to explain, qualify, discredit, or destroy
a criminal defendant's direct examination.27 The court also found
20. Witherell, 118 Ill. 2d at 334, 515 N.E.2d at 74. In Witherell, the defendant physi-
cian continued to give the plaintiff estrogen therapy in spite of a condition that contra-
indicated such therapy and that resulted in further harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 324-32,
515 N.E.2d at 70-73. Because the defendant warned the plaintiff that car trips also would
aggravate the condition, the plaintiff's repeated prolonged auto trips were adjudged to be
comparatively negligent. Id. at 339, 515 N.E.2d at 77. The Witherell court also affirmed
the use of the Physician's Desk Reference ("PDR") as a basis for expert testimony. Id. at
334, 515 N.E.2d at 75 (citing Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 Ill. 2d 411,
303 N.E.2d 392 (1973)).
21. Id. at 334, 515 N.E.2d at 74.
22. Id. Both the supreme court and the appellate court seemed to ignore ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2501 (1987), which requires the trial court to evaluate the "rela-
tionship of the medical specialties of the witness to the medical problem and the type of
treatment administered in the case." Neither court evaluated whether the witness's spe-
cial expertise in the drug field prevented him from properly evaluating the standard of
care.
23. See Dolan, 77 111. 2d at 285, 396 N.E.2d at 16.
24. 122 Ill. 2d 221, 522 N.E.2d 1146, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 264 (1988).
25. Id. at 246, 522 N.E.2d at 1157-58 (citing People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 149,
490 N.E.2d 640, 647 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1987)).
26. Id. at 245, 522 N.E.2d at 1157. During a trial for a drug-related robbery-murder,
the State cross-examined the defendant about his use of cocaine and about a letter that he
sent to his girlfriend. Id. The letter stated: "I still believe I can escape from here one way
or the other." Id. The letter also cautioned his girlfriend that it would help his case if
she stayed in Arkansas and did not testify. Id. This letter was admissible under the
party-opponent hearsay exception because it showed the defendant's consciousness of
guilt. Id. at 246, 522 N.E.2d at 1158.
27. Id. at 247, 522 N.E.2d at 1158 (citing People v. Williams, 66 Ill. 2d 478, 486-87,
363 N.E.2d 801, 805 (1977) (the trial court's admission of testimony regarding defend-
ant's involvement in a prior burglary when defendant was on trial for murder was not an
abuse of discretion)).
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that the defendant waived his objection to the admission of prior
cocaine dealing by his failure to object at trial.2" Furthermore, the
court stated that the admission of evidence of other crimes was not
prejudicial under the facts of the case.29
Further, the court upheld witness impeachment by a prior in-
consistent statement when the prosecutor reminds the witness of
the time, place, substance, and circumstances of the prior state-
ment.3" In Gacho, the prosecutor impeached the defendant's wife
with a prior inconsistent statement that she made to the police on
the night of her husband's arrest.3' The supreme court rejected the
defendant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to give a
limiting instruction regarding the prior inconsistent statement.32
The supreme court concluded that the defendant waived this argu-
ment by neither requesting the instruction nor objecting at trial.3
In People v. Thompkins,34 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting cross-exami-
nation into a State witness's bias. 35 The trial court restricted cross-
examination of the State's chief witness concerning a pending co-
caine charge because the witness had already testified about the
plea agreement on that charge.36 The supreme court stated that
28. Id. at 245, 522 N.E.2d at 1157.
29. Id. at 246, 522 N.E.2d at 1158. The court also agreed that it was proper to admit
a letter stating defendant's intent to escape and to influence his girlfriend improperly
because it was evidence of guilt. Id.
30. Id. at 252, 522 N.E.2d at 1161 (citing People v. Cobb, 97 Ill. 2d 465, 479, 455
N.E.2d 31, 37 (1985) (proper foundation for impeachment existed because the cross-ex-
amination questions properly warned the witness of her prior inconsistent statement)).
31. Id. at 250-51, 522 N.E.2d at 1160. On direct examination, the witness stated that
on the night of the murder her husband was home with her and the children and that she
did not know if anyone came to her apartment because she was asleep. Id. at 251, 522
N.E.2d at 1160. On cross-examination, she denied telling a police officer on the night of
her husband's arrest that she heard her husband planning to rob and kill two drug dealers
and that she had cleaned the cocaine pipes the dealers used at their apartment. Id. at
251-52, 522 N.E.2d at 1160. Later, on rebuttal, a police officer testified regarding this
earlier statement. Id.
32. Id. at 252-53, 522 N.E.2d at 1160-61.
33. Id. at 253, 522 N.E.2d at 1160-61.
34. 121 Ill. 2d 401, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988).
35. Id. at 441, 521 N.E.2d at 55-56. In Thompkins, the supreme court upheld a trial
court's exercise of discretion on the relevancy of evidence. Id. at 455, 521 N.E.2d at 61-
62. The supreme court refused to overturn the trial judge's decision that mitigating let-
ters from family and acquaintances were largely irrelevant. Id. at 454-55, 521 N.E.2d at
62. The trial judge found that most of the letters were from family or people only slightly
familiar with the defendant. Id.
36. Id. at 441-42, 521 N.E.2d at 55-56. Bias can be shown by evidence that the wit-
ness testified in the hopes of a dismissal of a pending charge. See, e.g., People v. Owens,
102 Ill. 2d 88, 464 N.E.2d 261, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984) (jury was aware of
pending burglary charge and witness believed that testimony would help him in his case);
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the error, if any, in refusing to permit further inquiry into the wit-
ness's cocaine charge was harmless.37
In addition, the supreme court upheld the trial court's admission
of testimony regarding a witness's fear of the defendant.3" After
cross-examination concerning the witness's motives, the State reha-
bilitated the witness by eliciting testimony that the witness feared
the defendant.3 9 The supreme court distinguished cases that disal-
lowed a witness's testimony regarding a defendant's threats or in-
timidation.' In Thompkins, the court found that the witness
merely expressed fear of the defendant. This testimony was admit-
ted for the limited purpose of explaining his relocation request,4"
which had been introduced during cross-examination.42
In People v. Orange,43 the Illinois Supreme Court held that to
qualify as a prior inconsistent statement, a statement must be in-
consistent with trial testimony, not earlier statements. 44  In Or-
People v. Steel, 52 Ill. 2d 442, 447, 288 N.E.2d 355, 359 (1972) (jury knew witness was in
protective custody and had received no promise about his pending charge).
37. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 442, 521 N.E.2d at 56. The supreme court also upheld
the admission of evidence that a murder victim left a spouse and child after the witness
established the identity of the decedent. Id. at 446, 521 N.E.2d at 58. At trial, the wit-
ness testified that she was the victim's common-law wife and that she had a child by the
deceased. Id. Although evidence of a surviving spouse and children is generally inadmis-
sible because it is irrelevant and unduly inflames the jury, the court reasoned that a jury is
not unfairly prejudiced when the reference is isolated and not presented to the jury as
bearing on defendant's guilt. Id. at 446-47, 521 N.E.2d at 58. See also People v. Rami-
rez, 98 Ill. 2d 439, 452-54, 457 N.E.2d 31, 37-38 (1983), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2189
(1987) (calling the victim's widow during the sentencing hearing to testify merely to her
marriage was error); People v. Davis, 97 Il1. 2d 1, 27-28, 452 N.E.2d 525, 537-38 (1983)
(evidence that victim's wife had delivered a baby on the day after the murder was unduly
prejudicial); People v. Jordan, 38 Ill. 2d 83, 91-92, 230 N.E.2d 161, 165-66 (1967) (vic-
tim's mother testifying that victim had a wife and child was harmless error).
38. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 442-44, 521 N.E.2d at 56.
39. Id. On redirect, the witness affirmed that he had requested relocation because he
was afraid the defendant would harm him. Id.
40. Id. at 442-45, 521 N.E.2d at 56 (distinguishing People v. Herbert, 361 Ill. 64, 196
N.E. 821 (1935) (witness's admission that police were detailed to her home gave the jury
the impression that she feared the defendant, even though she had not requested a police
guard)). See also People v. Dace, 114 Ill. App. 3d 908, 449 N.E.2d 1031 (3d Dist. 1983)
(prosecutor implied that the defendant made threats against the witness by repeatedly
asking if a witness was afraid to testify); People v. Mostafa, 5 Ill. App. 3d 158, 274
N.E.2d 846 (1 st Dist. 1971) (prosecutor's questioning implied that the accused would kill
a 16-year-old pregnant witness).
41. Thompkins, 121 Ill. 2d at 444, 521 N.E.2d at 56.
42. Id. at 444, 521 N.E.2d at 57. The supreme court reasoned that the State is given
wide latitude to overcome the negative impact of a cross-examination revealing a wit-
ness's bias and motive to lie. Id.
43. 121 Ill. 2d 364, 521 N.E.2d 69, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 247 (1988).
44. Id. at 381, 521 N.E.2d at 77. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-10.1(a)
(1987).
Evidence
ange, a witness made a statement to the police immediately after
the crime that inculpated the defendant.45 Later, in a pretrial letter
and at trial, the same witness confessed to the crimes with which
the defendant had been charged.46 The State impeached the wit-
ness's confession by using the prior inconsistent statement that he
made to the police." To rehabilitate the witness, the defendant
sought to admit the witness's pretrial confession letter as a prior
statement that was inconsistent with the police statement.48 The
supreme court upheld the trial court ruling that because the letter
was consistent with trial testimony, the letter could not be admit-
ted as a prior inconsistent statement.49
In Orange, the court also reaffirmed that records of juvenile ad-
judications are admissible as aggravating evidence at a capital sen-
tencing hearing.50 The defendant argued that the Juvenile Court
Act5 only allows the use of juvenile adjudications in sentencing
under the Unified Code of Corrections 52 which does not contain
the capital sentencing provisions. 3 The supreme court relied on
legislative intent, noting that the Unified Code of Corrections in-
corporates the capital sentencing provision by reference. 4 There-
fore, the court held that juvenile adjudications may properly be
introduced at capital sentencing hearings.5
45. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d at 371, 521 N.E.2d at 72.
46. Id. at 379, 521 N.E.2d at 76.
47. Id. at 380, 521 N.E.2d at 76.
48. Id. at 381, 521 N.E.2d at 77.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 388, 521 N.E.2d at 80 (citing People v. Owens, 102 Ill. 2d 88, 112-13, 464
N.E.2d 261, 272 (1984); People v. Stewart, 101 Ill. 2d 470, 494, 463 N.E.2d 677, 689,
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984)).
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 801-10 (1987). The Juvenile Court Act provides:
"Evidence and adjudications in proceedings under this Act shall be admissible: ... in
criminal proceedings when the court is to determine the amount of bail, fitness of the
defendant or in sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections." Id.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1001-1-1 to 1008-6-1 (1987).
53. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d at 388, 521 N.E.2d at 80. The capital sentencing provisions
are codified in the Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (1987).
54. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d at 388, 521 N.E.2d at 80. Paragraph 1005-5-3(c)(1) of the
Unified Code of Corrections states in pertinent part: "When a defendant is found guilty
of murder, the State may either seek a sentence of imprisonment under § 5-8-1 of this
Code, or where appropriate seek a sentence of death' under § 9-1 of the Criminal Code of
1961." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3(c)(1) (1987).
55. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d at 388-89, 521 N.E.2d at 80. In Orange, the court also re-
viewed the application of the marital privilege to criminal proceedings. Id. at 384, 521
N.E.2d at 78 (citing People v. Sanders, 99 Ill. 2d 262, 457 N.E.2d 1241 (1983)). Exercise
of the marital privilege requires a confidential communication shared only by the hus-
band and wife, and the invocation of the privilege before the spouse's testimony. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 155-1 (1987). Following the defendant's testimony that he had
not asked his girlfriend to "come into court" for him, his estranged wife testified that the
1989]
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C. Videotaped Deposition
In People v. Johnson,56 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
admission of an improperly made videotape resulted in reversible
error in a sexual abuse trial." In Johnson, the five-year-old victim
was unable to testify coherently with the jury and defendant in the
courtroom. 8 The trial court sustained the State's motion to video-
tape crucial parts of the victim's testimony with the jury absent
and with the defendant watching a video monitor in another
room. 9 The trial court relied on Supreme Court Rule 414, which
authorizes the videotaping of depositions, 6° but only under the
defendant told her that the girlfriend would provide him with a false alibi. Orange, 121
Ill. 2d at 384, 521 N.E.2d at 78. The court held that there was no error in admitting the
wife's testimony because the defendant failed to invoke the privilege before his wife testi-
fied, and also because a third party was present during their conversation. Id. The court
also stated that contrary to the defendant's assertions, the wife's testimony did properly
rebut the defendant's testimony. Id. The defendant stated that the girlfriend had not
agreed to testify for him. Id. In rebuttal, the wife testified that the defendant told her
that the girlfriend would provide a false alibi. Id. Given the disparity between the two
stories, the court held that the defendant's testimony had been rebutted properly. Id.
In Orange, the court also held that the trial judge properly invoked the attorney-client
privilege on behalf of a defense witness. Id. at 378, 521 N.E.2d at 75. When he was
initially picked up for questioning shortly after the murders, Kidd (who later became the
defendant's chief witness) said that the defendant committed an arson and multiple homi-
cide. Id. at 371, 521 N.E.2d at 72. At that time, Kidd was represented by the defend-
ant's attorney. Id. at 373, 521 N.E.2d at 73. Later, the attorney withdrew from
representing Kidd because of a conflict of interest. Id. at 377, 521 N.E.2d at 75. At trial
Kidd was questioned and admitted committing the arson and murders. Id. at 371, 521
N.E.2d at 72. The State cross-examined Kidd and used the prior statement and shared
attorney to impeach him. Id. at 373, 521 N.E.2d at 73. The State pointed out that after
discussions with defendant's attorney, Orange and Kidd suddenly reversed their stories,
which they could do again at Kidd's trial (a "frick and frack defense"). Id. During
Kidd's rehabilitation, the defendant's attorney began to inquire into conversations be-
tween himself and Kidd, upon which the judge sustained the State's objection on the
grounds of the attorney-client privilege, which Kidd had not waived. Id. at 377-78, 521
N.E.2d at 75. The defendant's counsel overstepped the bounds of the privilege by asking
the witness to state why the defendant's counsel discontinued representing the witness.
Id. The defendant's counsel was permitted to bring out only the fact that he had not
represented the witness for more than a year. Id.
56. 118 Ill. 2d 501, 517 N.E.2d 1070 (1987).
57. Id. at 512, 517 N.E.2d at 1075.
58. Id. at 505, 517 N.E.2d at 1072.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 507, 517 N.E.2d at 1073 (citing People v. Zehr, 103 Ill. 2d 472, 469 N.E.2d
1062 (1984) (videotaped testimony may be used instead of transcribed testimony)). See
also Supreme Court Rule 414, which provides in pertinent part: "[I]f... the deposition
.. . is necessary for the preservation of relevant testimony because of the substantial
possibility it would be unavailable at the time of hearing or trial, the court may ... order
[it] . . . in accordance with rules providing for the taking of depositions in civil cases
.... " ILL. S. CT. R. 414, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 414 (1987).
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same circumstances in which transcribed depositions are allowed.6
In allowing the videotaped deposition, the appellate court deter-
mined that the witness was "unavailable" to testify.62 The supreme
court analyzed Federal Rule of Evidence 804 to determine if the
victim was unavailable.63 The supreme court concluded that an
unwilling child is not unavailable to testify for purposes of
Supreme Court Rule 4 14 .64 While a court may exclude disinter-
ested persons from a child-abuse proceeding, 65 the new state law on
videotaped testimony still requires that the defendant be permitted
to be present at the recording. 66
III. RELEVANCE
In People v. Richardson,67 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
crimes committed after a charged offense are admissible as evi-
dence of other crimes.6  The supreme court rejected the defend-
ant's argument that the dissimilarity of the second crime
committed three days after the murder prevented its use in proving
the defendant's identity69 because the other crimes need not be
61. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d at 508, 517 N.E.2d at 1073. The court stated that although
the trial judge has discretion to permit the use of videotaped depositions, this discretion
presupposes that the standards for using any deposition have been satisfied. Id. at 507-08,
517 N.E.2d at 1073.
62. Id. at 508-09, 517 N.E.2d at 1073. Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
defines "unavailability" for use with respect to a hearsay exception if the declarant of the
statement is unavailable as a witness. FED. R. EvID. 804. The Johnson court declined to
adopt all of the definitions listed in Rule 804 but did "embrace the general principles
reflected therein." Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d at 509, 517 N.E.2d at 1073. The court concluded
that the Rule 804 definition of "unavailability" is very narrow and does not encompass
the raped child's mere reluctance. Id. at 509, 517 N.E.2d at 1074.
63. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d at 508-10, 517 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
64. Id. at 510, 517 N.E.2d at 1074.
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-11 (1987).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 106A (1987). For a further discussion of Johnson,
see Clarke & Jacobson, Juvenile Law, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 501, 502 (1989).
67. 123 Ill. 2d 322, 528 N.E.2d 612 (1988).
68. Id. at 339, 528 N.E.2d at 617. The defendant had committed two robberies after
the armed robbery and murder for which he was on trial. Id. at 338, 528 N.E.2d at 617.
In a second armed robbery committed three days after the murder, witnesses identified
him, and the bullet he shot into a bystander was recovered and found to be the same as
two bullets shot in the first robbery-murder. Id. at 339-40, 528 N.E.2d at 617. Following
a third robbery committed approximately one month later, the defendant was appre-
hended as matching the description of a fleeing robber. Id. at 342, 528 N.E.2d at 619.
The defendant argued that evidence of these later robberies tended to prejudice the jury
unduly. Id. at 343, 528 N.E.2d at 619. See People v. Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 137, 402
N.E.2d 238, 242 (1980) (extensive testimony on defendant's involvement in an arson
committed after the murder unduly prejudiced the jury to believe that he had also com-
mitted the murder).
69. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d at 339, 528 N.E.2d at 617. The defendant claimed that
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identical to the crime charged.7 ° The supreme court also upheld
the admission into evidence of the gun used in both crimes and the
eyewitness identification of the defendant in the second crime be-
cause both the gun and the identification tied the defendant to the
charged crime.7'
In Richardson, the supreme court also held that evidence of a
third crime was not admissible to show "how the investigation un-
folded and how defendant came into custody. 7 2 The court con-
cluded that the State failed to link the third crime to the charged
crime or to show a "threshold similarity" to establish a modus
operandi connection between the two crimes.7 3 The court stated
that admission of evidence of a third crime was not reversible error
because its discussion was not extensive.74
In People v. Johnson,75 the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed its
prior holding7 6 that mercy is a relevant consideration in a capital
sentencing hearing, within the context of all factors in aggravation
and mitigation.77 In Johnson, the aggravating factors included an
associated felony, multiple homicides, 7 and previous convictions
significant differences distinguished the two crimes. Id. For example, at the second rob-
bery, the defendant was observed waving a gun, jumping over a counter, using profanity,
and wearing a full, trimmed beard. Id. None of these were observed at the murder-
robbery. Id.
70. Id. (citing People v. Taylor, 101 Ill. 2d 508, 463 N.E.2d 705 (1984)).
71. Id. at 340-41, 528 N.E.2d at 617. See also People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176,
182, 449 N.E.2d 821, 825, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 844 (1983) (evidence of defendant's
involvement in an armed robbery similar to one committed two days earlier in which a
man was killed was admissible to show defendant's identity and motive). The Richardson
court also stated that by these evidentiary rulings, the trial court had admitted no more
detail of the crime than was necessary, and even if the jury heard some nonessential
details, it was not reversible error. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d at 341-42, 528 N.E.2d at 618.
72. Richardson, 123 Ill. 2d at 342, 528 N.E.2d at 618.
73. Id. at 342, 528 N.E.2d at 618-19 (citing People v. Bartall, 98 IlM. 2d 294, 310-11,
456 N.E.2d 59, 67 (1983) (intent to commit murder could be inferred from a later shoot-
ing incident with the same gun)).
74. Id. at 343, 528 N.E.2d at 619. The mere reference to the third crime was not
reversible error because it did not impair substantial rights or contaminate the jury; the
testimony disclosed only that "the police had apprehended the defendant as matching...
the description of a[n armed robbery] suspect." Id. The court distinguished People v.
Lindgren, 79 Ill. 2d 129, 402 N.E.2d 238 (1980), in which it reversed a conviction because
of prejudice arising from the more extensive testimony of the collateral crime and weaker
evidence on the trial offense than in Richardson.
75. 119 Ill. 2d 119, 518 N.E.2d 100 (1987).
76. See People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S.
Ct. 1618 (1988); People v. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133, 469 N.E.2d 119 (1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1220 (1985).
77. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 150, 518 N.E.2d at 115.
78. Id. at 148, 518 N.E.2d at 113. The defendant stabbed to death four unarmed
females while robbing a ceramic shop. Id. at 123, 518 N.E.2d at 102.
Evidence
for murder and other violent crimes.7 9 The supreme court noted
that it previously had found that mercy and other mitigating fac-
tors were relevant at the sentencing phase."0 The court also noted
that the United States Supreme Court has held that "compassion-
ate factors" are relevant in capital cases,8 but in some instances
jury instructions not to consider sympathy or prejudice are appro-
priate.8 2 Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the trial
judge had properly considered mercy, but found no facts warrant-
ing its application.8 3
IV. HEARSAY
A. Double Hearsay
In People v. Rogers, 4 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the ex-
clusion of testimony by the defendant's family members regarding
police abuse while the defendant was in custody.85 At trial, the
defendant offered the testimony of family members who he tele-
phoned shortly after confessing to the murder.8 6 This testimony
was offered to bolster the defendant's claims of involuntary waiver
of Miranda rights and involuntary confession to the murder be-
cause of threats and promises from police officers.87 The defend-
ant's family members would have testified that the defendant
mentioned threats to them shortly after his confession. 8 The court
upheld both the exclusion of this testimony and the trial court's
decision to allow the relatives' statements as "an offer of proof."81 9
79. Id. at 133, 518 N.E.2d at 106.
80. Id. at 150, 518 N.E.2d at 114 (citing People v. Hall, 114 Ill. 2d 376, 499 N.E.2d
1335 (1976)).
81. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330 (1985).
82. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (upholding trial judge's instruction
not to consider "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion
or public feeling"). The trial judge instructed the jury on the weight to be given three
days of character testimony on behalf of a defendant who had confessed to murder in
open court. Id.
83. Johnson, 119 Ill. 2d at 150, 518 N.E.2d at 115. The court stated that the trial
court correctly found no evidence warranting either mercy or a sentence other than
death. Id.
84. 123 Ill. 2d 487, 528 N.E.2d 667 (1988).
85. Id. at 499, 528 N.E.2d at 673.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 498-99, 528 N.E.2d at 673.
88. Id. at 499, 528 N.E.2d at 673.
89. Id. The court also held that co-conspirator confessions are not admissible during
the second phase of a sentencing hearing because the confessions lack credibility. Id. at
521-23, 528 N.E.2d at 684. The two co-conspirators were lovers and had read newspaper
accounts indicating what the police knew before they were arrested. Id. One co-conspir-
ator admitted having had several conversations with the other between the killings and
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In People v. Foster,90 the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed its
prior holding that double hearsay is admissible in a capital sentenc-
ing hearing when it is adequately "corroborated by other evi-
dence." '9  The double hearsay occurred when police officers
testified to second-hand accounts of the defendant's prior crimes.92
With regard to the first prior crime, the supreme court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the
double hearsay corroborated by a certified copy of conviction for
armed robbery and eyewitness testimony. 93 Regarding the second
crime, the court also held that the uncorroborated testimony re-
garding the incident was reliable because the testifying officer ob-
tained the information during an official investigation. 94
their arrest; hence, they probably synchronized their stories before arrest. Id. When the
two co-conspirators were arrested, the police had already obtained the defendant's con-
fession and the statement of another participant and no doubt pressured the two co-
conspirators into giving statements. Id. at 521, 528 N.E.2d at 683. These confessions are
distinguished from co-conspirator admissions which are not hearsay if they are made
during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. See E. CLEARY & M. GRAHAM, HAND-
BOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 802.10 (4th ed. 1984); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The
Illinois Supreme Court decision follows the United States Supreme Court decision in Lee
v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), in which the Court held that co-conspirator statements
benefitting the declarant and incriminating a defendant are "presumptively unreliable"
and should not be admitted during the guilt phase of a criminal trial. Id. at 541. Addi-
tionally, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that these inculpating confessions must also be
excluded from the sentencing hearing. Rogers, 123 Ill. 2d at 521, 528 N.E.2d at 683. The
trial record indicated that these co-conspirator statements were unreliable for the follow-
ing reasons: One statement was internally inconsistent; the prosecutor thought that a
party was too unreliable to testify; and the stories minimized the co-conspirators' involve-
ment. Id. at 522-23, 528 N.E.2d at 683-84. Thus, the court remanded the case for a new
sentencing hearing without consideration of the co-conspirator confessions. Id. at 523,
528 N.E.2d at 684.
90. 119 Ill. 2d 69, 518 N.E.2d 82 (1987).
91. Id. at 98, 518 N.E.2d at 95. Even though hearsay is generally inadmissible in
criminal proceedings, it "is not per se inadmissible at a sentencing hearing as unreliable
.... The objection goes to the weight and not the admissibility." Id. at 98, 518 N.E.2d
at 94 (citing People v. Hall, 114 I11. 2d 376, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 951 (1987); People v. Perez, 108 I11. 2d 70, 86-87, 483 N.E.2d 250, 258-59 (1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1110 (1986); People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill. 2d 342, 478 N.E.2d 402,
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908 (1985)).
92. Id. at 97-98, 518 N.E.2d at 95. The police officers testified about two of the de-
fendant's past crimes. Id. at 97, 518 N.E.2d at 94. The first crime concerned a tavern
robbery during which the defendant intended to murder the bartender. Id. The crime
was adequately corroborated by a certified copy of conviction and by testimony from two
witnesses. Id. at 98, 518 N.E.2d at 95. The second crime concerned an unindicted crime
in which the police received an uncorroborated complaint that the defendant and others
had beaten a woman with a stick and knocked her teeth loose. Id. at 97, 518 N.E.2d at
94.
93. Id. at 99, 518 N.E.2d at 95.
94. Id. at 98-99, 518 N.E.2d at 95. In addition, because the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion without the uncorroborated testimony and because evidence
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B. Spontaneous Declaration Exception
In People v. Gacho,95 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld, under
the spontaneous declaration exception,96 the admission of a state-
ment made six and one-half hours after the declarant was shot. 97
In Gacho, the declarant was confined to a car trunk for the six and
one-half hours after he and a companion were shot and left for
dead.98 When the police officer first opened the trunk and asked
the victim who had shot him, the victim named the defendant. 99
The supreme court held that the declarant's multiple gunshot
wounds and confinement in a cold car trunk with a dead body were
sufficiently startling to produce an unreflected statement." The
court further noted that the declarant's statement was his first
chance to speak following his confinement. 10' Finally, the court
found that the identification of the defendant as the killer was re-
lated to the shooting. 102
In People v. Thompkins, 1 13 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule was sat-
isfied when the declarant's statement was an immediate response to
hearing gunshots. " The court stated that the declarant's state-
rules are less stringent during the sentencing phase, admission of uncorroborated hearsay
is not reversible error. Id. at 99, 518 N.E.2d at 95.
In Foster, the court also affirmed the trial court's ruling that the admission of a photo-
graph of a sleeping child in the apartment where her mother had been murdered was
harmless error because the evidence of the defendant's guilt was so overwhelming that
any prejudice caused by the photo was harmless. Id. at 89, 518 N.E.2d at 90 (citing
People v. Neal, 111 Ill. 2d 180, 197, 489 N.E.2d 845, 851 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1165 (1986) (passing reference to children and grandchildren of victim was not reversible
error); People v. Holman, 103 Ill. 2d 133, 166, 469 N.E.2d 119, 144 (1984) (during final
arguments, defense counsel mentioned defendant's family and then prosecutor mentioned
victim's family, to which no timely objection was made)).
95. 122 Ill. 2d 221, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (1988).
96. The court reaffirmed the spontaneous declaration test from People v. Poland, 22
Ill. 2d 175, 181, 174 N.E.2d 804, 807 (1961), which defined a spontaneous declaration as:
"(1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting state-
ment; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circum-
stances of the occurrence." Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d at 240-41, 522 N.E.2d at 1155.
97. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d at 240, 522 N.E.2d at 1155-56.
98. Id. at 240-41, 522 N.E.2d at 1155.
99. Id. at 240, 522 N.E.2d at 1155.
100. Id. at 240-41, 522 N.E.2d at 1156.
101. Id. at 240, 522 N.E.2d at 1155.
102. Id. at 241-42, 522 N.E.2d at 1156.
103. 121 Ill. 2d 401, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988).
104. Id. at 428-29, 521 N.E.2d at 49. The defendant planned to lure two drug dealers
to the declarant's home to rob and kill them. Id. at 421, 521 N.E.2d at 45. The declarant
asked the drug dealers to bring a large quantity of drugs to her home. Id. at 415, 521
N.E.2d at 43. When the drug dealers arrived, the declarant took them to the basement.
Id. The defendant burst into the room with a gun and claimed to be a policeman. Id. He
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ment was a spontaneous declaration because the gunshots were a
sufficiently startling event, the statement was made immediately af-
ter the startling event, and the statement was directly related to the
circumstances of the shooting.10 5
C. Prior Consistent Statement
In People v. Ashford,1°6 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
witness's prior consistent statement may be used to rebut a charge
of motive for false testimony when the witness made the statement
before having a reason to fabricate. 10 7 On cross-examination of the
witness, the defendant questioned whether the witness fabricated
his testimony about the murder weapon in return for the State
dropping drug charges against him.108 On redirect, the witness
stated that he had made the consistent statement before the State
agreed to drop the charges. 109 The defendant argued that the prior
consistent statement did not predate the motive to fabricate be-
cause the witness was already jailed and hoping for release.110 The
court held that the prior consistent statement was properly admit-
ted because mere hope for release from jail is not proof of motive to
fabricate. " 1
tied up the drug dealers and took them to another room while the declarant and the
defendant's girlfriend went upstairs. Id. Later, when two shots rang out, the declarant
cried: "No, I told them not to do it here. I knew it wouldn't go according to plans." Id.
at 416, 521 N.E.2d at 43. The girlfriend later testified to having heard this statement. Id.
at 427-29, 521 N.E.2d at 49.
105. Id. at 428-29, 521 N.E.2d at 49.
106. 121 Ill. 2d 55, 520 N.E.2d 332 (1988).
107. Id. at 70-72, 520 N.E.2d at 338. See also People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 455
N.E.2d 41 (1983). In Emerson, the supreme court upheld the trial court's admission of
witness testimony concerning the consistency of his identification of the defendant in
order to rebut the inference of inconsistency. Id. at 500-01, 455 N.E.2d at 46-47.
108. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d at 70, 520 N.E.2d at 338.
109. Id. at 71, 520 N.E.2d at 338.
110. Id.
111. Id. Even if the admission of the statement were error, it was harmless compared
to the extensive evidence against the defendant, and the error was minimized by the trial
judge's decision to limit its use solely for rehabilitation. Id. at 71-72, 520 N.E.2d at 338.
In People v. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d 364, 521 N.E.2d 69 (1988), the supreme court held that
a letter offered as a prior consistent statement was inadmissible because the witness wrote
it after he had a motive to fabricate. Id. at 378-79, 521 N.E.2d at 76 (citing People v.
Clark, 52 11. 2d 389, 288 N.E.2d 363 (1972) (defendant's alibi witness for the murder
told the same story when police initially searched her house as at the trial but had the
same motive to fabricate on both occasions)). In Orange, the witness initially confirmed
the sequence of events on the night of the murder in agreement with the defendant's
confession to the multiple homicide. Id. at 371, 521 N.E.2d at 73. Later, he stated that
his mother and grandmother had convinced him to tell the truth (his confession to the
murders exculpating the defendant). Id. at 378-79, 521 N.E.2d at 76. Additionally, the
witness wrote his confession in a letter. Id. The letter was inadmissible because it merely
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V. PRIVILEGE
In People v. Foggy, 1' 2 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the absolute rape-counselor-client privilege," 3
which prohibits rape counselors from disclosing any records of
counseling rape victims without the victim's consent." 4 The de-
fendant subpoenaed from the victim's rape counselor "all records,
reports, notes, memoranda, statements, oral, recorded, or written,
and any and all other documents concerning the alleged as-
sault.""' After the subpoena was quashed, the trial court denied
the defendant's request for in camera inspection of "information
that could be used for impeachment purposes.""' 6 The defendant
argued that his sixth amendment right to confrontation rendered
this privilege unconstitutional." 7 The defendant relied on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska," 8
which found a constitutional violation in legislation protecting ju-
venile arrest information." 9 The defendant also cited Pennsylvania
v. Ritchie,120 in which the United States Supreme Court refused to
recognize an absolute privilege when a statute provided for in cam-
era inspection of state agency investigational records of child abuse
charges. 2 I
The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished the cases cited by the
"corroborated the change of heart" to which the witness had already testified. Id. at 379,
521 N.E.2d at 76.
112. 121 Ill. 2d 337, 521 N.E.2d 86 (1988).
113. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802.1 (1987). Paragraph 8-802.1 extends an
unqualified privilege to a rape victim's statements made to a rape crisis counselor. Id.
See infra note 125 for the text of paragragh 8-802.1.
114. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 350, 521 N.E.2d at 92.
115. Id. at 341, 521 N.E.2d at 88.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 342, 521 N.E.2d at 88 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.");
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (when the defendant did not cross-examine a wit-
ness at the preliminary hearing, he lost his opportunity to confront him and the witness's
testimony was admissible at trial)). See also ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8; People v. Tennant,
65 Ill. 2d 401, 408, 358 N.E.2d 1116, 1120, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918 (1976) (the witness
died after testimony and cross-examination at preliminary hearing but before defendant's
trial; defendant had adequate opportunity to confront and was not impaired by an ab-
sence of discovery before the preliminary hearing).
118. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
119. Id. at 319-20 (defendant's right to confront and impeach witness was deemed
superior to protection of confidentiality of juvenile arrests).
120. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
121. Id. at 60-61.
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defendant.' 22 The court limited Ritchie to statutes that allow in
camera inspections. a2 3  Illinois' earlier rape-counselor privilege
statute permitted such limited use of rape counseling records; 24
however, the revised act no longer allows in camera inspection. 125
Furthermore, the court noted that Ritchie concerned an investiga-
tive fact-finding agency, and Foggy concerned a rape crisis coun-
selor who was eliciting feelings, not necessarily facts.' 26 The court
concluded that the defendant had ample opportunity to confront
and to impeach the witness, and that the defendant's rights were
amply protected without access to statutorily protected records. 27
VI. CONCLUSION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court gradually
refined Illinois evidence law. It attempted to even the balance be-
tween expert physician witnesses and opposing attorneys by ex-
panding the grounds for impeachment. The court also expanded
the spontaneous declaration time limit to six and one-half hours
under special circumstances. It required that videotaped deposi-
tions only be allowed under the same conditions as written deposi-
tions. And finally, the supreme court relied on, but did not adopt,
Federal Rule of Evidence 804 for determining witness
unavailability.
122. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 343-47, 521 N.E.2d at 89-91.
123. Id. at 346-47, 521 N.E.2d at 89 (citing Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 n.14).
124. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802.1(c) (Smith-Hurd 1984). The prior statute
provided for no disclosure without the consent of the victim, unless:
[I]n any judicial proceeding, a party alleges that such statements are necessary
to the determination of any issue before the court . . . the party may ask the
court to consider the relevance and admissibility of the statements . . . [and]
hold a hearing in camera .... If it finds them relevant and admissible to the
issue, it shall order them disclosed.
Id.
125. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-802.1(c) (1987). Paragraph 8-802.1 provides:
"No rape crisis counselor shall disclose any confidential communication or be examined
as a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding as to any confidential communication
without the consent of the victim." Id.
126. Foggy, 121 Ill. 2d at 348-49, 521 N.E.2d at 91. The court also found no burden
on the defendant who "had access to [many] unprivileged statements made by the [vic-
tim] to other persons. . . including the [victim's] nearly contemporaneous statements ...
and ... testimony at the preliminary hearing." Id. at 349, 521 N.E.2d at 91-92.
127. Id. at 350, 521 N.E.2d at 92. Justice Simon's dissent reached the opposite con-
clusion - the victim's confidentiality was amply protected by in camera inspection. Id.
at 351, 521 N.E.2d at 97 (Simon, J., dissenting). Justice Simon also concluded that the
right to confront requires that the defendant have available all relevant information per-
taining to the witness. Id. at 356, 521 N.E.2d at 98 (Simon, J., dissenting).
